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Abstract 
 
This paper focuses on the “contingent” view of transparency. By 
introducing endogenous fiscal policy and labour market distortions, it 
studies the effects the uncertainty in central bank’s (CB) preferences on the 
behaviour of wage and fiscal authorities and thus on output and inflation. 
We consider the problem on both positive and normative perspectives. First, 
we investigate the effects of a given degree of uncertainty in CB’s 
preferences on inflation and real output. Second, in line with recent 
literature, by assuming the possibility that information on CB’s preferences 
may be an endogenous variable, we study the optimal degree of 
transparency from the CB’s viewpoint. Although a general analysis is 
presented, we focus on the case of a small-bounded variance of CB’s 
preference, i.e. we assume that the CB’s power of affecting information 
disclosure and influencing private beliefs is limited.  
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1. Introduction  
The macroeconomic importance of central bank (CB from now onward) 
transparency is increasingly debated in the literature. According to a popular 
view, progressively supported by several central bankers,1 transparency 
allows for Pareto-improving forecasts and decisions (Blinder, 1998; Blinder 
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(Jean Monnet Lectures) and Pisa. A previous version of the paper circulated with the title: 
“Budget policy, conservativeness and the optimal degree of central bank transparency.”  
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giuseppe.ciccarone@uniroma1.it. Financial support from the University of Rome “La 
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1 Greesnpan (2001) recalls that in past decades several central bankers believed that 
monetary policy is most effective when it is least transparent, as market uncertainty creates 
differences of opinion on the future prices of short-term debt instruments and thus thick 
markets, and an increased degree of liquidity. In the 1980s, they reckoned instead that being 
explicit about short-run targets would make such targets more difficult to change, hindering 
adjustments to evolving market and economic conditions. Today, central bankers reckon 
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et al., 2001) and favours cooperative behaviour (Bini-Smaghi and Gros, 
2001).2 According to an opposite view, information disclosure reduces 
instead the possibility for CBs to use their private information strategically.3 
And this is no good as, for example, information asymmetries between CBs 
and the general public about the weight of the arguments in the authorities’ 
objective functions4 may affect trade union behaviour, induce wage 
moderation (Sorensen, 1991) and decrease both the level and the variance of 
inflation (Grüner, 2002). Other theoretical contributions have reached 
different results, and surveys of the subject matter are already available (see, 
e.g., Geerats, 2001; Posen, 2003). 
In spite of these efforts, the theoretical literature seems to be unable 
to explain the heterogeneous behaviour of CBs in information disclosure 
(Bini-Smaghi and Gros, 2001; Eijffinger and Geraats, 2002; Di Bartolomeo 
and Marchetti, 2003; Demertzis and Hughes-Hallet, 2003) and several results 
remain alien to the scanty and conflicting findings of the empirical 
literature.5 In particular, it is not clear whether transparency strongly affects 
the average level of inflation and output deviation,6 while it remains 
                                                                                                                                                    
that financial markets work more efficiently when effort need not be wasted to infer the 
stance of monetary policy. 
2 Ferguson (2002) stresses that CB transparency about its own actions and the way it 
perceives the economic outlook improves market participants’ expectations of future short 
rates, bringing longer rates closer to those desired by the authorities. Moreover, 
transparency allows market participants to better anticipate policy responses in the face of 
unexpected developments, thus speeding economic adjustments. 
3 This line of research elaborates on the effects of information asymmetries between CBs 
and the general public documented by Canzoneri (1985). 
4 See Beetsma and Jensen (1998) and Walsh (2003). 
5 Given the strong limitations of the data, the empirical evidence should be seen in terms of 
correlations between variables rather than causal relations. 
6 For example, Demertzis and Hughes-Hallet (2003) claim that this is not the case for the 
nine countries for which Eijffinger and Geraats (2002) constructed their indexes. 
  3 
 
 
 
 
difficult to establish its effects on output and inflation variability. According 
to Chortareas et al. (2001)7 and to Demertzis and Hughes-Hallet (2003), 
disclosure reduces inflation volatility at the expense of a rise in output 
volatility, whereas Kuttner and Posen (1999, 2000, 2001) argue that 
inflation targeting central banks display higher flexibility in responding to 
shocks without reducing their ability to respond to output volatility. The 
most convincing evidence suggests however that conservative (i.e., anti-
inflationary) and transparent CBs are able to reduce both levels and 
variances of output and inflation (Posen, 2002). 
In this paper, we aim to provide an explanation for both the latter 
finding and the heterogeneous behaviour of actual CBs in information 
disclosure. To this aim, we focus on the so-called “contingent” view of 
transparency (Posen, 2003), i.e., that related to CB’s objectives, which 
originated from the Barro and Gordon (1983) approach to monetary policy,8 
but we reach different results from those achieved by this strand of the 
literature. According to that view, the optimal degree of transparency 
depends upon the CB’s degree of conservativeness.9 More conservative CBs 
generate lower inflation variability (as higher credibility produces stronger 
reputation and higher ability to control inflation) and a steeper short-run 
Phillips curve (and/or less attention to output stabilization), and thus have 
                                                          
7 A critique of the measures of transparency used by Chortareas et al. (2001), as well as of 
their methodology, is in Posen (2001). 
8 According to this approach, since discretionary monetary policy produces suboptimal 
outcomes, monetary authorities should pre-commit to publicly announced policies, be 
independent and inflation averse (Rogoff, 1985). In order to be accountable, their behaviour 
must be predictable and verifiable by the public, and this cannot obtain if they do not 
disclose the information they possess. 
9 See Cukierman (2002), Faust and Svensson (2001a, 2001b), Gersbach and Hahn (2001a, 
2001b), Jensen (2001) and Geraats (2001). 
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lower control on output. As a consequence, there should be a trade-off 
between inflation volatility and output volatility10 which has been however 
rejected by the available cross-sectional evidence.11 Moreover, an inverted 
U-shaped curve for the amount of desirable transparency there should exist: 
most and least credible CBs should disclose less than those of intermediate 
credibility. 
By introducing endogenous supply-side fiscal policy and labour 
market distortion into the analysis,12 and by treating transparency as an 
endogenous variable in the hands of the CB (in line with a suggestion by 
Faust and Svensson, 2002), we shall demonstrate that, if the uncertainty 
about the CB’s preference is bounded to low values, the behaviour of 
different CBs in information disclosure is different because the optimal (for 
the CB) degree of transparency varies with the main institutional 
characteristics of the economy: degree of labour market competitiveness, 
degree of CB conservativeness, constraints on fiscal policy.  
Transparency may have a significant impact on economic 
performances only in economies where real wages are highly distorted by 
union behaviour. In such contexts, if fiscal policy is inactive and uncertainty 
on CB’s preferences is small, for a conservative CB it is optimal to be fully 
transparent (as this minimizes its loss, defined in terms of output and 
                                                          
10 See Ball (1999) and Svensson (1999) for a discussion of this trade-off in the context of 
inflation targeting. 
11 See Debelle and Fischer (1995), Blinder (1998), and Kuttner and Posen (1999). 
12 Despite some attempt (e. g. Huges-Hallet and Viegi 2001), the inclusion of fiscal policy 
in the analysis of transparency has not been generally pursued. And yet, as reported by 
Bini-Smaghi and Gros (2001), CBs have threatened to tighten monetary policy not only if 
wage negotiations were inconsistent with price stability, but also if budget projections were 
overshot. 
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inflation), whereas for a populist CB it is optimal to be fully opaque. This is 
so because if the CB is conservative (populist), uncertainty has a small 
(great) impact on output and the cost for the union of underestimating 
monetary policy is higher (lower) than that of overestimating it. This 
implies that wage policies are more (less) aggressive when trade unions do 
not perfectly know the CB’s preferences. Conservative (populist) monetary 
authorities hence (do not) prefer to eliminate this kind of uncertainty in 
order to moderate wage claims rather than relying on the wage discipline 
device represented by opacity.  
If the government aims instead at supporting employment through 
supply-side fiscal policy, full transparency (opacity) is optimal when the CB 
is perceived as conservative (ultra-populist). If the CB is perceived as 
moderately populist, the optimal degree of transparency depends on the 
fiscal stance of the government: when this is very active in stabilising the 
economy (relative to controlling inflation), it is optimal for the CB to be 
fully transparent; when the government faces a tight constraint on budget 
deficits, it is instead optimal to be fully opaque.  
Fiscal policy hence expands the range of possible results: 
conservativeness keeps on making always useless the wage discipline 
device represented by opacity, whereas this mechanism is always important 
when the CB is perceived as extremely populist. In intermediate cases, the 
less the government acts to support employment the more it is optimal for 
the CB to be opaque (in the limit, we hence go back to case of an inactive 
government). If unions are induced to increase wages by a government 
supporting employment through deficit spending, raising public 
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employment will compensate for the fall in private employment, but prices 
will increase with budget lassitude and it will be convenient for a 
moderately populist CB to constrain the unions’ behaviour by letting them 
know that it would not be willing to fully accommodate the wage push. 
Our final result is that an increase in transparency always reduces 
both inflation and output variance. This is in line with Posen’s (2003) claim 
that fully transparent and conservative CBs are able to reduce levels and 
variances of both output and inflation. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we construct a policy 
game between a money wage setting union, a fiscal authority and a CB, and 
we solve it under a Stackelberg sequence of players’ moves. In section 3 we 
analyse the effects of an increase in CB transparency on the levels and the 
variances of inflation and output deviation, under different assumptions on 
the “type” of CB (more or less conservative) and on the stance of fiscal 
policy (fiscal authorities more or less concerned about losses induced by 
fiscal expansions). Section 4 offers concluding comments. 
 
2. The model  
In this section we lay down a simple policy game made up by two equations 
describing the economy and by three equations describing policymakers’ 
preferences. Aggregate demand and aggregate supply are:  
 pmx −=        (1) 
 x p w bη= − +        (2) 
where x is the output deviation for its non-distorted natural level, m is the 
money stock, π=p  is the price level (inflation), w is the nominal wage and 
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b is the net level of a supply-side fiscal policy. Equation (1) is a well-known 
and straightforward simple representation for the demand side. Equation (2) 
is the aggregate supply. In line with recent literature,13 we express it in 
terms of real wage instead of price expectations to introduce endogenous 
labour market distortions – derived from a trade union optimization 
problem. Moreover, equation (2) also includes the possibility for fiscal 
policy to influence the aggregate supply of output. This idea, which has 
been increasingly employed in the recent literature, can be justified in 
several different ways. 
1. First, b can be a fiscal surplus (b < 0), or deficit (b > 0), which has a 
permanent effect on output if maintained through time (Hughes-Hallett and 
Viegi, 2001; Demertzis, Hughes-Hallett and Viegi, 2004). In this case, 
equation (2) may summarise the idea that the aggregate supply of output can 
be split into a private component, produced by competitive and profit-
maximising firms (which give rise to the usual inverse relationship between 
output and the real wage), and a public component, generated by a 
government producing the same (aggregate) good produced by private firms 
and expanding the level of output by directly purchasing labour through 
non-monetary budget deficits (Acocella and Ciccarone, 1997).  
2. Second, b may be a public investment which raises the private sector 
productivity, or a production subsidy to the firms that raises the supply of 
goods and services and reduces prices, and which can be financed by per-
head taxes and/or by taxation on sales or on income (Dixit and Lambertini, 
2003). 
                                                          
13 See Cukierman (2004) for a survey. 
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3. Finally, b may be interpreted as a measure of social security or non-wage 
costs imposed on employers, or taxes on labour, or the costs of supply side 
constraints, or market restrictions, or job protection legislation imposed on 
producers; or the costs of any market imperfections in the wage-bargaining 
process that might keep real wages above market clearing levels (Demertzis, 
Hughes-Hallett and Viegi, 2004) 
In any case, monetary policy operates on the demand side and fiscal 
policy on the supply side: an increase in b ceteris paribus reduces prices, 
and raises output and employment, thus favouring an increase in the 
nominal wage set by the union. This set-up is useful, as it enables us: (a) to 
study the effects of transparency on output and inflation in a simple model 
with fiscal policy, and so to take the government’s preferences (and some 
institutional constraints, like the European Stability and Growth Pact) 
directly into account; (b) to compare our results with those of other models 
already present in the literature which take on board the idea that 
government deficit spending does not influence the demand side of the 
economy.  
The players’ preferences, with all variables in logs, are: 
 2 21
2 2
B
BL E x
β π⎡ ⎤= − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦      (3) 
 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++−= 222
42
1
2
bxEL GGG
ϕπβ     (4) 
 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−= 2
2
1)( xwELU πα      (5) 
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where [ ]  E ⋅  is the expectation operator and subscripts indicate the player 
(CB, government and union). The objective functions are quadratic in all 
arguments but are linear in the real wage.14 Whereas the hypothesis 
underlying equations (3) and (5) are rather common in the literature;15 the 
Government objective function LG deserves more attention.  
In line with the existing literature, we do not include an explicit 
budget constraint into the model, but constrain fiscal policy by placing 
penalties on its use through the introduction of b in the government’s loss 
function, with the parameter Gϕ  measuring the weight of such penalties. It 
can be thought of as influenced, among other things, by specific institutional 
constraints posed on fiscal policy: when the fiscal discipline becomes tight, 
due e.g. to international agreements (as the Stability and Growth Pact), the 
cost for the Government to pursue an active fiscal policy increases, and this 
can be represented by a higher level of Gϕ .  
The justification for this approach can be split in three steps. 
1. It is possible to interpret the government’s present value budget 
constraint (the liabilities to GDP ratio at time t is equal to the 
surplus to GDP ratio at time t plus the expected value of future 
discounted surplus to GDP ratios) as a condition that must be 
satisfied in equilibrium. This occurs if fiscal policy generates a 
                                                          
14 This has become a standard assumption in recent policy games. For an early use and 
justification see Acocella and Ciccarone (1997); see also Acocella and Di Bartolomeo 
(2004). 
15 The linear-quadratic nature of the union preference is common in literature (for a review, 
see Cukiermak, 2004). A double-quadratic function however does not alter qualitatively our 
results. For a complete discussion on linear-quadratic and double quadratic form in  policy 
games, see Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2004).  
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sequence of future surplus to GDP ratios which satisfies the 
condition independently of the values taken in equilibrium by the 
discount factors, or the initial liabilities to GDP ratio. 
Alternatively, if the sequence of future surplus to GDP ratios is 
arbitrary, the discount factors, or the initial liabilities to GDP 
ratio must move so as to satisfy the equilibrium condition.  
2. Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001) have shown that if (i) the 
sequence of surplus to GDP ratio is determined by the liabilities 
to GDP ratio (through a positive and bounded away from zero 
infinitely often time varying response parameter) and a bounded 
random variable (encapsulating political and economic factors), 
and (ii) the sum of the discount factors converges,16 then the 
flow budget constraint is dynamically stable, and the 
government’s present value budget constraint is respected for 
any initial liabilities to GDP ratio. We do not need the fiscal 
response to be strong enough, but only that the discounted value 
of the liabilities to GDP ratio at time t + T goes to zero as T goes 
to infinity. If the response parameter is constant, any positive 
value guarantees this result; in the case of a time varying fiscal 
response, it may be arbitrarily small and infrequent.  
3. The inclusion of the fiscal deficit (or, more in general, of fiscal 
policy) in the government’s cost function guarantees that the 
fiscal response will be such that the solutions of the model are 
both sustainable (i.e., they satisfy the long-run solvency 
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constraint) and can be financed in advance (i.e., they satisfy the 
“cash in advance” constraints):.the budget constraint does not 
bind.17 
The timing of the game is as follows: (i) the union sets w; (ii) the 
government fixes b; the CB chooses m. These assumptions encapsulate the 
idea that wage contracts are set for a period of time which is longer than that 
the time horizon of fiscal policy and, even more, than that of monetary 
policy. The game is solved backward.18 In order to study the optimality of 
transparency, we also consider the possibility that the CB could 
endogenously choose the degree of transparency.19 Technically, this 
corresponds to introduce an initial stage in which the CB decides the degree 
of information disclosure that becomes so endogenous.  
The solution of the CB problem gives the following reaction 
function:  
 BbBwm η+−=       (6) 
where 
1
1
+
−=
B
BB β
β  is an index of the CB’s degree of conservativeness: if 
0B <  ( 0B > ) the CB follows a (non) accommodating policy with respect 
                                                                                                                                                    
16 This implies that the growth rate exceeds the average real interest rate for only finitely 
many periods. 
17 See also Demertzis, Hughes-Hallett and Viegi (2004, Appendix A). 
18 Huges-Hallet and Viegi (2001) employ a similar model, but they envisage a Nash 
equilibrium between the CB and the government, with a private sector (not a union) acting 
as Stackelberg leader with respect to the public sector. We prefer the sequential timing 
since it seem to be the equilibrium concept that better caputures fiscal and monetary 
interaction (see, e.g., Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1998; Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999). See also 
Dixit and Lambertini (2003) for a general discussion. 
19 We follow a suggestion by Faust and Svensson (2002), who envisage transparency as an 
endogenous variable in the hands of the CB. Differently from them, we do not however try 
to determine the optimal degree of CB’s transparency through simulations. 
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to wage expansion. Parameter B  varies between −1 and 1, which 
correspond to the limit cases of an ultra-liberal and an ultra-conservative 
CB, respectively. Note that if the CB accommodates wage increases, it 
cannot accommodate fiscal expansions (i.e., increase m when b increases). 
Given equation (6), output, inflation and the real wage can be written 
as: 
 ( )bwBx η−+−=
2
1       (7) 
 ( )bwB ηπ −−=
2
1       (8) 
 1 1
2 2
B Bw w bπ η+ −− = +      (9) 
 However, in setting their policy, the government and the union 
cannot predict these equations since they are not perfectly informed about 
the CB’s preferences. Both players know only the mean of the inflation 
reaction, BBE =)( , and its variance, ( )22B E B Bσ ⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦ .  
The government optimization problem is: 
( ) ( )
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ +⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+−+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−−= 2
22
42
1
2
1
2
1
2
max bbwBbwBEL GGGb
ϕηηβ       (10) 
the first order condition is: 
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]{ } 0211 22 =+−+−−−− bbwBbwBE GG ϕηηηηβ           (11) 
and the corresponding fiscal rule is: 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 2
2 22
1 1
2 1 1
G
G G
E B E B
b w Kw
E B E B
η β
ϕ η β
⎡ ⎤− + +⎣ ⎦= =⎡ ⎤+ − + +⎣ ⎦
  (12) 
where: 
 
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
2 22 2
2 22 2 2
1 1
2 1 1
G B B
G G B B
B B
K
B B
η β σ σ
ϕ η β σ σ
⎡ ⎤− + + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦= ⎡ ⎤+ − + + + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  (13) 
In equation (12) it is ( )[ ] ( ) 222 11 BBBE σ++=+ ; hence K is a 
constant and [ ] KKE = . 
By using (12), the union’s optimization problem can be written as: 
 ( ) ( ) ⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+−−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−
2
1
2
1
2
11
2
11max wKBwKBE
w
ηηα  (14) 
the first order condition is: 
 ( ) ( ) 01
2
11
2
11
2
=⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+−−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−− wKBKBE ηηα   (15) 
and the wage rule is: 
 
( )( )
( )22
2 1 1
2
1 1
B K
w
E B K
η αη
− − −= ⎡ ⎤+ −⎣ ⎦
     (16) 
Being ( )wKBx η−+−= 1
2
1  and ( )wKB ηπ −−= 1
2
1 , the equilibrium 
outcomes are: 
 ( )( ) ( )2
1 1
1
1 1
K K B
x B
E B K
η η αη
+ + −= − +⎡ ⎤+ −⎣ ⎦
    (17) 
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 ( )( ) ( )2
1 1
1
1 1
K K B
B
E B K
η ηπ αη
+ + −= −⎡ ⎤+ −⎣ ⎦
    (18) 
Being ( )[ ] ( ) 222 11 BBBE σ++=+ , equations (17) and (18) can be 
expressed in terms of the variance 2Bσ , which represents the degree of 
opacity of the CB: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 22 2 2 2
2 2
1 1 1 1
1
1
G G G B
G B
B B B
x B
B
ϕ η β η η β σ α
ϕ σ
+ + − + + + += − +⎡ ⎤+ +⎣ ⎦
     (19) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 22 2 2 2
2 2
1 1 1 1
1
1
G G G B
G B
B B B
B
B
ϕ η β η η β σπ α
ϕ σ
+ + − + + + += −⎡ ⎤+ +⎣ ⎦
       (20) 
Equations (19) and (20) immediately clarify that opacity is relevant 
only if the wage distortion introduced by α is significantly high. The higher 
is α the higher are inflation and unemployment,20 as in this economy the 
only distortion is due to the presence of unions and wage bargaining: in a 
competitive labour market the issue of transparency loses its relevance. At 
the same time, an increase in Bβ  increases B which, given expectations, 
increases unemployment but decreases inflation, in line with the traditional 
view introduced by Rogoff (1985). Finally, since the effects of CB’s opacity 
are either positive or negative on both unemployment and inflation, we to 
focus only on the latter variable.  
 
                                                          
20 Although implicitly, the same result is obtained by Grüner (2002). 
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3. The effect of transparency on inflation and unemployment 
Henceforth, we assume that: 
 B Bβ β ε= +        (21) 
where ε  is a random error with ( ) 0=εE and ( ) 2var εσε = . This means that 
the government and the union are correct on average, but may make 
mistakes when guessing the CB’s preferences at certain points in time.21  
From equation (21) it follows that:22  
 [ ] ( )
2
3
21 1 1
1 1 1
B B B
B B B B
E B E E εσβ β ε ββ β ε β β
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + − −= = = −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥+ + + +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
  (22) 
 ( )
2
2
4
4var( )
1
B
B
B εσσ β= = +      (23) 
Henceforth we assume that 2 20,ε εσ σ⎡ ⎤∈⎣ ⎦ and define (an index of) 
opacity as  
2
2S
ε
ε
σ
σ=  and therefore (an index of) transparency as 
2 2
21T S
ε ε
ε
σ σ
σ
−= − = . This implies that S = 1 and T = 0 when 2 2ε εσ σ=  and S 
= 0 and T = 1 when 2 0εσ = . 
 
 
 
                                                          
21 See Hughes-Hallet and Viegi (2001); Geeraats (2002); Demertzis and Hughes-Hallet 
(2003). 
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3.1 The Barro-Gordon case 
When Gϕ → +∞ , i.e., when the fiscal authority is inactive, our model is 
equivalent to the policy-game formulation of the traditional Barro-Gordon 
framework;23 the only difference is that, in our case, the model allows for 
the possibility of a non-transparent CB. In such a case the equilibrium 
outcomes are:24 
 ( ) ( )2 2
1 1
1 B
Bx B
B
ασ
+= − ++ +      (24) 
 ( ) ( )2 2
1 1
1 B
B B
B
π ασ
+= −+ +      (25) 
By applying equations (22) and (23) to equations (24) and (25) we get: 
 
( )
( ) ( )
2 2
22 22 2
1 1
1 21 1
B B
B
B B B
Bx ε
ε ε
β β σ α
ββ β σ σ β
+ − += − +⎡ ⎤+ − + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  (26) 
 
( )
( ) ( )
2 2
22 22 2
1 1
1 21 1
B B
B
B B B
Bε
ε ε
β β σ απ ββ β σ σ β
+ − −= +⎡ ⎤+ − + +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  (27) 
In the case of absence of uncertainty in CB’s preferences ( 2 0εσ = ), 
T = 1 and equations (26) and (27) imply the traditional result of monetary 
policy neutrality, output deviation equal to the private-induced distortion, 
                                                                                                                                                    
22 More precisely, these are well-known approximations for the expected value and the 
variance of B  (see, for example, Mood et al., 1974). 
23 See, e.g., Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994), Acocella and Ciccarone (1997), Acocella and 
Di Bartolomeo (2004). 
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i.e. x α= − , and the inflation bias equal to 
B
απ β= . Allowing for uncertain 
in CB’s preference, it follows instead that for ( )22 2ˆ1B Bε εσ β β σ= + ≡  the 
outcomes of the policy game are zero output deviation and zero inflation. 
The basic intuition is that a reduction in transparency leads to more wage 
discipline, as claimed by Sorensen (1991) and Grüner (2002), and thus to 
lower inflation and unemployment. 
The optimal T, i.e., that which minimizes the CB’ loss, depends 
however upon the perceived CB’s degree of conservativeness which, as it is 
traditionally understood, is deeply connected with the level of credibility 
(the anti-inflationary attitude) of the CB. Two cases can be distinguished: (i) 
the CB is perceived as conservative ( 1Bβ > ) when it is expected to react to 
a wage increase with a reduction in the money supply (i.e. a credible CB); 
(ii) the CB is perceived as populist ( 1Bβ < ) when it is expected to react to a 
wage increase with an increase in the money supply (i.e. an inflationary 
CB).  
The effects of 2εσ  on inflation (and on output) are represented in the 
following figure. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
24 They are simply obtained by applying the Hôpital rule to equations (19) and (20). 
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Figure 1 – Effects of opacity on inflation 
Panel (A) Panel (B) 
  
Populist central bank (β<1) Conservative central bank (β>1) 
 
 
Assuming that25 2 2ˆ0 ε εσ σ< ≤ , for a populist CB it is optimal to have  
T = 0, 26 that is, 2 2ε εσ σ= , whereas for a conservative CB it is optimal to 
have T = 1 if ( )( )22 1B B Bεσ β β β< − +  and T = 0 otherwise, as the curve is 
hump shaped, with a maximum at ( )( )22 1B B Bεσ β β β= − + .  
Hence, if the uncertainty on CB’s preferences is small (close to zero), 
as it is realistic to assume, our analysis produces a neat result: for 
conservative CBs it is optimal to be fully transparent (T = 1), whereas for 
                                                          
25 This assumption is without loss of generality: if 2ˆεσ  is feasible, the optimal 2εσ  of the CB 
is 2ˆεσ  and, therefore, values greater than 2ˆεσ  will never be optimal. 
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populist CBs it is optimal to be fully opaque (T = 0). The economic 
explanation of this conclusion is clear. The union knows that, if the CB is 
conservative (populist), uncertainty has a small (great) impact on output 
(equation 24); as in the union’s utility function the cost of a real wage 
decrease is linear and that of a greater output deviation is quadratic, under a 
conservative (populist) CB the cost of underestimating m is higher (lower) 
than that of overestimating it;27 this implies that wage policies are more 
(less) aggressive when the trade union does not perfectly know the CB’s 
preferences. Hence, a conservative CB has an incentive to eliminate this 
kind of uncertainty in order to moderate wage claims, rather than relying on 
the wage discipline device represented by opacity. The opposite applies in 
the case of a populist CB. Our result provides further support to the claim by 
Demertzis and Viegi (2002, p. 3) that credible policies do not necessitate 
transparency: only in the absence of credibility, transparency becomes a 
relevant issue. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
26 This result is similar to that by Grüner (2002), but it emerges in our model only as a 
special case. The difference is due to a misspecification in Grüner’s model (see Ciccarone 
et al., 2003).  
27 This asymmetry in the costs produced by mistakes in the estimation of m can be 
explained by considering that: (i) such mistakes imply a cost for the union in terms of 
higher output and lower real wages, (ii) the union internalises the CB reaction and so (iii) 
the cost of higher output deviations decreases more than proportionally with β, whereas the 
cost of real wage decreases are linear in β. 
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3.2 Supply-side fiscal policy 
When Gϕ  is finite, and so fiscal policy is active, the analysis becomes more 
complex. After tedious algebra, it turns out that the effect of opacity on the 
level of inflation (and of output) is determined by the following inequality:28  
 
 21 22 0 G GA A
ε
π ϕ η βσ
∂ > ⇔ >∂      (28) 
where: ( ) ( )( )4 2 421 1 1 12 2A ε ε
σ ββ β σ β β= − + + − +   
( )( ) ( )( )2 44 22 11 1 3 1 12A ε εσ β β σ β β= − − + + − + . 
Henceforth we focus on T instead of 2εσ  (recall that the two are 
inversely related). Since both 1A  and 2A  can be positive or negative, two 
mutual cases must be considered: 
 for 2 21
1
0 : 0 G
G
AA
T A
ϕπ ηβ
∂> < ⇔ >∂     (29)  
 for 2 21
1
0 : 0 G
G
AA
T A
ϕπ ηβ
∂< < ⇔ <∂     (30)  
01 >A  holds for 2 1dεσ >  and 2 2dεσ < , where ( ) ( ) ( )21,2 1B B Bd β β β= ± +  
with 1 2d d> , 1 0d > , and 2 0d >  iff 1β > ; 2 0A >  holds for 2 1dεσ >  and 
                                                          
28 The derivative of inflation with respect to opacity is, in fact, 21 2G GA Aϕ η β− . 
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2
2dεσ < , where ( ) ( ) ( )221,2 1 1 4 1 12 B B B Bn β β β β= − ± + − +  with 2 0n < , and 
1 0n >  iff 1 3β > . Notice that it is always 1 1 2 2d n d n> > >  and 2 0n < . 
The effects of transparency on inflation and output deviation 
variances are determined by the following condition:  
 ( )2 2 2 10 2eTπ ε ε
σ π ππ σ σ
∂ ∂< ⇔ = > −∂∂     (31)  
Where )(πe  is the elasticity of inflation with respect to 2εσ . If 
0Tπ∂ ∂ < , it is also 2 0Tπσ∂ ∂ <  (recall that 2 0επ σ > ): if transparency 
reduces the level of inflation, it also reduces its variability. When it is 
instead 0Tπ∂ ∂ >  (i.e. opacity reduces inflation), if ( ) 1
2
e π < , then 
2 0Tπσ∂ ∂ < : increases in T reduce inflation and output variances when the 
increase in the level is small enough (i.e., the reduction in inflation induced 
by a one percent increase in opacity must be lower than one half, or the 
increase in inflation induced by a one percent increase in transparency must 
be lower than one half). 
We again restrict our investigation to the most interesting (and 
realistic) case by assuming that the disturbance on CB’s preference is 
bounded to a small value (i.e., we limit our investigation to the interval 
around zero).29 The effect of opacity on the level of inflation (and of the 
                                                          
29 More precisely, our results hold according to the following conditions: for ( )2 20, dεσ ∈  
if 1Bβ > ;  for ( )2 10, nεσ ∈  if ( )1 3,1Bβ ∈ ; and for ( )2 10, dεσ ∈  if ( )0,1 3Bβ ∈ . A 
qualitative investigation for ( )2 0,εσ ∈ +∞ , based on equation (27), is available upon 
request.  
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output deviation) is determined by computing the derivative of equation 
(20) with respect to 2εσ  in zero (remembering to take account of equations 
(22) and (24)): 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )2
2
2 4
0
1 2 3 1 11
2 1
G B B G B
G B B
B
εε σ
ϕ β β η β β απ
σ ϕ β β=
⎡ ⎤− + − −∂ ⎣ ⎦=∂ +  (32) 
Equation (27) is positive when the two following conditions hold: 
  
 for 
( )
( )2
2
2
0
2 3 1
1: 0
1
BG
B
G B Bεε σ
η βϕπβ σ β β β=
−∂< > ⇔ <∂ −   (33) 
 for 
( )
( )2
2
2
0
2 3 1
1: 0
1
BG
B
G B Bεε σ
η βϕπβ σ β β β=
−∂> > ⇔ > −∂ −   (34) 
Equations (33) and (34) are associated with a populist and a 
conservative CB, respectively. 
a) If the CB is populist, two cases are possible.  
(i) If 1 3Bβ <  (CB ultra-populist), equation (28) is never satisfied, 
thus full opacity (i.e. T = 0) is always optimal.  
(ii) If ( )1 3,1Bβ ∈  (CB moderately populist), both full transparency 
and full opacity can be optimal. If 
( )
( )
22 3 1
1
BG
G B B
η βϕ
β β β
−> − , full 
opacity (i.e. T = 0) is optimal; if  
( )
( )
22 3 1
1
BG
G B B
η βϕ
β β β
−< − , full 
transparency (i.e. T = 1) is optimal. 
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b) If the CB is conservative, full transparency is always optimal (i.e. T = 1), 
since equation (34) is always satisfied.  
Hence, the incentives for the CB to be opaque depend upon the 
behaviour of the government only under a specific credibility regime. As in 
the case of an inactive fiscal authority, full transparency (T = 1) is optimal 
when the CB is perceived as conservative, whereas full opacity (T = 0) is 
optimal when the CB is perceived as ultra-populist. If the CB is perceived 
instead as moderately populist, the optimal degree of transparency depends 
on the relative fiscal stance of the government( G Gϕ β ): when the 
government in very active in stabilising the economy (i.e. for low values of 
G Gϕ β ), it is optimal for the CB to be fully transparent (T = 1); when the 
government faces a tight fiscal constraint (i.e. for high values of G Gϕ β ), it 
is optimal for the CB to be fully opaque (T = 0).   
As in the Barro-Gordon’s case, credibility and opacity are substitutes 
as means to discipline workers’ wage claims. However, the consideration of 
the government’s action complicates the picture, since also fiscal policy 
affects the real output deviation and inflation. Opacity continues to 
disciplines the union, but it also induces the government to adopt a more 
prudent behaviour. Hence, if the CB is not credible, it will use opacity to 
discipline wage setters only if the government is not very active. In the 
opposite case, the moderately populist CB will instead prefer to place the 
burden of stabilization on the fiscal authority (i.e., to induce a more active 
fiscal policy) by fully revealing its nature, as fiscal policy is able to 
compensate with public employment the fall in private employment due to 
increasing wages (the higher is Gϕ  the higher is K in equation (12), and so 
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the higher is b for a given w), while having a lower impact on prices (as it 
expands the supply of goods) than monetary policy. 
Finally, the effects of opacity on inflation and output variances are 
determined by computing the derivative of the inflation variance, 
( ) ( )( )
2
22 2
2
1 1
1 1B
K K B
E E
E B Kπ
η ησ π π σ αη
⎛ ⎞+ + −⎜ ⎟= − =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎜ ⎟⎡ ⎤+ −⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
, with respect to 2εσ  in 
zero: 
 
( ) ( )
( )2
2 22
2
42 2
0
1 2
2 0
1
G B B B G
B B Gε
π
ε σ
ϕ β β η β βσ ασ β β ϕ=
+ + +∂ = >∂ +
  (35) 
Equation (35) implies that if the uncertainty about the CB’s 
preference is bounded to low values, an increase in opacity always raises 
inflation (and output) variance. 
As a conclusion, and in line with Posen’s (2003) claim, fully 
transparent and conservative CBs are able to reduce levels and variances of 
both output and inflation. 
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we provided a theoretical explanation for both the empirical 
finding that fully transparent and conservative CBs are able to reduce levels 
and variances of both output and inflation (Posen, 2003) and for the 
heterogeneous behaviour of actual CBs in information disclosure. By 
focusing on the “contingent” view of transparency, by introducing 
endogenous fiscal policy into the analysis, and by treating information on 
the central bank’s preference as an endogenous variable, we showed that an 
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increase in transparency always reduces both inflation and output variance 
and that the behaviour of different CBs in information disclosure is different 
because the optimal degree of transparency varies with the main 
institutional characteristics of the economy.  
As long as information is considered as an endogenous strategic 
variable, it can be used by the CB as a substitute for credibility to discipline 
wage setters. The size of the effects of such a policy depends on the degree 
of labour market distortion which is present in the economy (i.e. the effects 
are stronger in highly unionised economies). For conservative (populist) 
CBs, if fiscal policy is inactive, it is optimal to be fully transparent (opaque) 
because they do not need (do need) to rely on the wage-discipline device 
represented by opacity. If the government aims instead at supporting 
employment through supply-side fiscal policies, full transparency (opacity) 
remains optimal when the CB is perceived as conservative (ultra-populist), 
but if the CB is perceived as moderately populist, the optimal degree of 
transparency depends on the fiscal attitude of the government: when this is 
very active in stabilising the economy, it is optimal for the CB to be fully 
transparent; when the government faces a tight constraint on budget deficits, 
it is optimal to be fully opaque. 
Fiscal policy hence expands the range of possible results: the wage 
discipline device represented by opacity remains useless (important) when 
the CB is perceived as conservative (extremely populist). In intermediate 
cases, the more the government acts to support employment the more it is 
optimal for the CB to be transparent. In fact, by considering the 
government’s action, the CB can still discipline the wage setters by 
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increasing opacity, but in so doing it also induces a more prudent fiscal 
policy. Hence, if the government is very active, the moderately populist CB 
prefers to reveal its nature and place the burden of stabilization on the fiscal 
authority, as fiscal policy is less inflationary than monetary policy. 
These results are of course confined to the case of supply-side fiscal 
policies. We focused on such measures in order to consider, in a simplified 
way, the channels of policy transmission operating on the both the demand 
(monetary) and the supply (fiscal) sides of the economy. In principle, the 
same logic described for supply-side fiscal policies should however apply 
also in the case of Keynesian policy, as the benefit of the wage discipline 
effect would be lowered by the reduced stabilization activism of a 
government made more prudent by opacity. 
An empirical evaluation of our results is difficult to carry out for 
several technical reasons, like the lack of observations, the subjective nature 
of the indexes measuring transparency and sampling problems.30 Our 
theoretical conclusions are not however at odds with casual observations. As 
predicted by the model, highly credible CBs – i.e. those adopting inflation 
targeting procedures, as in New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Sweden 
– are characterized by high degrees of transparency. By contrast, CBs 
attaching a low weight to inflation, perhaps as Japan, are characterized by 
high degrees of opacity.31  
                                                          
30 An attempt at evaluating the results of a similar model by using cross-country data has 
been performed by Demertzis and Hughes-Hallet (2003) with very limited success. 
31 Di Bartolomeo and Marchetti (2003), by applying the principal component procedure to 
the Eijffinger and Geraats’ (2002) indexes, find a clear correlation between credibility and 
transparency. 
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When considering the debate on central banking in an historical 
perspective, we can note that in the 1980s, after the oil shocks, the main 
issue under discussion was CB credibility, with many CBs promptly acting 
so as to implement it; this discussion was followed, in the 1990s, by that on 
transparency.32 The timing of this focus shift is in line with the idea that 
CBs started to change their policies in terms of transparency after they 
managed to enhance their credibility. That timing is also in opposition with 
the alternative and common suggestion that transparency supports 
credibility, even though this is not of course by any means a definitive proof 
of our claims. 
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